It is usual, since Wolf, to print πέλει in 396 instead of ποτί. The authority for this is very slight: E. M. 214. 33 from Diogenes βρόμος κυρίως το πυρς. ᾒχος. πεποιημένη δέ στιν ων κατ μμησιν το ποτελουµνου ψόφου ν πυρ, οον τσος γε πέλει βρόμος αθοµνοιο. schol. Ap. Rhod. III. 861 the etymology of Bx03B1;θριµώ … ἢ παρ το βρµον το πυρός. τσσος γρ πλεται βρµος γρ θες λαµπαδοΧος. It is not certain that either of these quotations refer (...) to our line; in the former, as will be noticed, πυρς is out of place, and we cannot tell how the second would have continued. In any case, it is not obvious what turned such an easy word as πλει into the difficult ποτ. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;I deal with two themes: the idea that an account of thought should be given by giving an account of the ascription of thoughts by a radical interpreter--which I call interpretationism; and the idea that psychological concepts like action and perception are essentially causal. It has often been thought that these two themes conflict; or at least, that if they can co-exist, then they must be kept separate, and (...) associated with different perspectives on behaviour. But is that right? I discuss the character of interpretationism and the nature of causal theories, and examine the extent to which the two themes are compatible. ;Chapter I explains and argues for an interpretationist approach, distinguishing between different interpretationist views, and defending interpretationism against various common objections. ;Chapter II examines the links between interpretationism and the anomalousness of the mental. I discuss a number of different arguments and distinguish a range of theses about anomalousness and indeterminacy which they may support. ;Chapter III discusses the motivation for causal theories. I explain why it matters that we should give causal theories within an interpretationist perspective rather than treating the two themes as insights of different perspectives; and I examine the difficulties of doing so. ;Chapter IV considers the causal theory of vision. I argue against the view that the interpretationist's conception of experience undermines the causal theory. ;Chapter V considers the case of action. I develop a substantive causal theory of action which responds to the following argument: that if we accept the interpretationist's claim that the mental is anomalous, then we must concede that mental properties cannot be causally relevant. ;From the particular cases, and on general grounds, I conclude that it is possible to adopt an interpretationist perspective which simultaneously sees the mental in causal terms; and that such a perspective is essential for an adequate understanding of the mind. (shrink)

Testimony, even in the well-worked parts of antiquity, continues to accrue, some from new papyri, some from texts long known but overlooked. In the result the critic is discomfited, honest men come by their own. οιόνδ' πέβη τόδε πργμα. This document, which consists of two lives of Homer and the Agon inserted between them, has long been derived from the Μουσεîον of Alcidamas. The conjecture was contested and the survival of Alcidamas denied. The publication of twenty-five lines from a papyrus (...) of s. II.–III. p. C. by Professor J. G. Winter , containing a Homeric biography signed αλκι] δαμαντος περι ομηρου put an end to the matter. See on the whole question Mr. Winter's remarks and a paper by Sig. Carlo Gallavotti of Bologna, Rivista di Filologia, 1929, 31. (shrink)

Before establishing his mature interpretation of infinitesimals as fictions, Gottfried Leibniz had advocated their existence as actually existing entities in the continuum. In this paper I trace the development of these early attempts, distinguishing three distinct phases in his interpretation of infinitesimals prior to his adopting a fictionalist interpretation: (i) (1669) the continuum consists of assignable points separated by unassignable gaps; (ii) (1670-71) the continuum is composed of an infinity of indivisible points, or parts smaller than any assignable, with no (...) gaps between them; (iii) (1672- 75) a continuous line is composed not of points but of infinitely many infinitesimal lines, each of which is divisible and proportional to a generating motion at an instant (conatus). In 1676, finally, Leibniz ceased to regard infinitesimals as actual, opting instead for an interpretation of them as fictitious entities which may be used as compendia loquendi to abbreviate mathematical reasonings. (shrink)

© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.Genetic studies have identified single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with the risk of prostate cancer. It remains unclear whether such genetic variants are associated with disease aggressiveness. The NCI-SPORE Genetics Working Group retrospectively collected clinicopathologic information and genotype data for 36 SNPs which at the time had been validated to be associated with PC risk from 25,674 cases with PC. Cases were grouped according to race, Gleason score and aggressiveness. Statistical analyses were used to compare the frequency (...) of the SNPs between different disease cohorts. After adjusting for multiple testing, only PC-risk SNP rs2735839 was significantly and inversely associated with aggressive and high-grade disease in European men. Similar associations with aggressive and high-grade disease were documented in African-American subjects. The G allele of rs2735839 was associated with disease aggressiveness even at low PSA levels in both European and African-American men. Our results provide further support that a PC-risk SNP rs2735839 near the KLK3 gene on chromosome 19q13 may be associated with aggressive and high-grade PC. Future prospectively designed, case-case GWAS are needed to identify additional SNPs associated with PC aggressiveness. (shrink)

The results of two recent articles expanding the Gibbs variational principle to encompass all of statistical mechanics, in which the role of external sources is made explicit, are utilized to further explicate the theory. Representative applications to nonequilibrium thermodynamics and hydrodynamics are presented, describing several fundamental processes, including hydrodynamic fluctuations. A coherent description of macroscopic relaxation dynamics is provided, along with an exemplary demonstration of the approach to equilibrium in a simple fluid.

Sustained attention, a key cognitive skill that improves during childhood and adolescence, tends to be worse in some emotional and behavioural disorders. Sustained attention is typically studied in non-affective task contexts; here, we used a novel task to index performance in affective versus neutral contexts across adolescence (N = 465; ages 11–18). We asked whether: (i) performance would be worse in negative versus neutral task contexts; (ii) performance would improve with age; (iii) affective interference would be greater in younger adolescents; (...) (iv) adolescents at risk for depression and higher in anxiety would show overall worse performance; and (v) would show differential performance in negative contexts. Results indicated that participants performed more poorly in negative contexts and showed age-related performance improvements. Those at risk of depression performed more poorly than those at lower risk. However, there was no difference between groups as a result of affective context. For anxiety there was no difference in performance as a function of severity. However, those with higher anxiety showed less variance in their reaction times to negative stimuli than those with lower anxiety. One interpretation is that moderate levels of emotional arousal associated with anxiety make individuals less susceptible to the distracting effects of negative stimuli. (shrink)

This co-edited volume compares Chinese and Western experiences of engineering, technology, and development. In doing so, it builds a bridge between the East and West and advances a dialogue in the philosophy of engineering. Divided into three parts, the book starts with studies on epistemological and ontological issues, with a special focus on engineering design, creativity, management, feasibility, and sustainability. Part II considers relationships between the history and philosophy of engineering, and includes a general argument for the necessity of dialogue (...) between history and philosophy. It continues with a general introduction to traditional Chinese attitudes toward engineering and technology, and philosophical case studies of the Chinese steel industry, railroads, and cybernetics in the Soviet Union. Part III focuses on engineering, ethics, and society, with chapters on engineering education and practice in China and the West. The book’s analyses of the interactions of science, engineering, ethics, politics, and policy in different societal contexts are of special interest. The volume as a whole marks a new stage in the emergence of the philosophy of engineering as a new regionalization of philosophy. This carefully edited interdisciplinary volume grew out of an international conference on the philosophy of engineering hosted by the University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. It includes 30 contributions by leading philosophers, social scientists, and engineers from Australia, China, Europe, and the United States. (shrink)

Automated reasoning about uncertain knowledge has many applications. One difficulty when developing such systems is the lack of a completely satisfactory integration of logic and probability. We address this problem directly. Expressive languages like higher-order logic are ideally suited for representing and reasoning about structured knowledge. Uncertain knowledge can be modeled by using graded probabilities rather than binary truth-values. The main technical problem studied in this paper is the following: Given a set of sentences, each having some probability of being (...) true, what probability should be ascribed to other (query) sentences? A natural wish-list, among others, is that the probability distribution (i) is consistent with the knowledge base, (ii) allows for a consistent inference procedure and in particular (iii) reduces to deductive logic in the limit of probabilities being 0 and 1, (iv) allows (Bayesian) inductive reasoning and (v) learning in the limit and in particular (vi) allows confirmation of universally quantified hypotheses/sentences. We translate this wish-list into technical requirements for a prior probability and show that probabilities satisfying all our criteria exist. We also give explicit constructions and several general characterizations of probabilities that satisfy some or all of the criteria and various (counter) examples. We also derive necessary and sufficient conditions for extending beliefs about finitely many sentences to suitable probabilities over all sentences, and in particular least dogmatic or least biased ones. We conclude with a brief outlook on how the developed theory might be used and approximated in autonomous reasoning agents. Our theory is a step towards a globally consistent and empirically satisfactory unification of probability and logic. (shrink)

Part I: The Life of Cognitive Science:. William Bechtel, Adele Abrahamsen, and George Graham. Part II: Areas of Study in Cognitive Science:. 1. Analogy: Dedre Gentner. 2. Animal Cognition: Herbert L. Roitblat. 3. Attention: A.H.C. Van Der Heijden. 4. Brain Mapping: Jennifer Mundale. 5. Cognitive Anthropology: Charles W. Nuckolls. 6. Cognitive and Linguistic Development: Adele Abrahamsen. 7. Conceptual Change: Nancy J. Nersessian. 8. Conceptual Organization: Douglas Medin and Sandra R. Waxman. 9. Consciousness: Owen Flanagan. 10. Decision Making: J. Frank Yates (...) and Paul A. Estin. 11. Emotions: Paul E. Griffiths. 12. Imagery and Spatial Representation: Rita E. Anderson. 13. Language Evolution and Neuromechanisms: Terrence W. Deacon. 14. Language Processing: Kathryn Bock and Susan M. Garnsey. 15. Linguistics Theory: D. Terence Langendoen. 16. Machine Learning: Paul Thagard. 17. Memory: Henry L. Roediger III and Lyn M. Goff. 18. Perception: Cees Van Leeuwen. 19. Perception: Color: Austen Clark. 20. Problem Solving: Kevin Dunbar. 21. Reasoning: Lance J. Rips. 22. Social Cognition: Alan J. Lambert and Alison L. Chasteen. 23. Unconscious Intelligence: Rhianon Allen and Arthur S. Reber. 24. Understanding Texts: Art Graesser and Pam Tipping. 25. Word Meaning: Barbara C. Malt. Part III: Methodologies of Cognitive Science:. 26. Artificial Intelligence: Ron Sun. 27. Behavioral Experimentation: Alexander Pollatsek and Keith Rayner. 28. Cognitive Ethology: Marc Bekoff. 29. Deficits and Pathologies: Christopher D. Frith. 30. Ethnomethodology: Barry Saferstein. 31. Functional Analysis: Brian Macwhinney. 32. Neuroimaging: Randy L. Buckner and Steven E. Petersen. 33. Protocal Analysis: K. Anders Ericsson. 34. Single Neuron Electrophysiology: B. E. Stein, M.T. Wallace, and T.R. Stanford. 35. Structural Analysis: Robert Frank. Part IV: Stances in Cognitive Science:. 36. Case-based Reasoning: David B. Leake. 37. Cognitive Linguistics: Michael Tomasello. 38. Connectionism, Artificial Life, and Dynamical Systems: Jeffrey L. Elman. 39. Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition: Andy Clark. 40. Mediated Action: James V. Wertsch. 41. Neurobiological Modeling: P. Read Montague and Peter Dayan. 42. Production Systems: Christian D. Schunn and David Klahr. Part V: Controversies in Cognitive Science:. 43. The Binding Problem: Valerie Gray Hardcastle. 44. Heuristics and Satisficing: Robert C. Richardson. 45. Innate Knowledge: Barbara Landau. 46. Innateness and Emergentism: Elizabeth Bates, Jeffrey L. Elman, Mark H. Johnson, Annette Karmiloff-Smith, Domenico Parisi, and Kim Plunkett. 47. Intentionality: Gilbert Harman. 48. Levels of Explanation and Cognition Architectures: Robert N. McCauley. 49. Modularity: Irene Appelbaum. 50. Representation and Computation: Robert S. Stufflebeam. 51. Representations: Dorrit Billman. 52. Rules: Terence Horgan and John Tienson. 53. Stage Theories Refuted: Donald G. Mackay. Part VI: Cognitive Science in the Real World:. 54. Education: John T. Bruer. 55. Ethics: Mark L. Johnson. 56. Everyday Life Environments: Alex Kirlik. 57. Institutions and Economics: Douglass C. North. 58. Legal Reasoning: Edwina L. Rissland. 59. Mental Retardation: Norman W. Bray, Kevin D. Reilly, Lisa F. Huffman, Lisa A. Grupe, Mark F. Villa, Kathryn L. Fletcher, and Vivek Anumolu. 60. Science: William F. Brewer and Punyashloke Mishra. Selective Biographies of Major Contributors to Cognitive Science: William Bechtel and Tadeusz Zawidzki. (shrink)

This book is a translation of W.V. Quine's Kant Lectures, given as a series at Stanford University in 1980. It provide a short and useful summary of Quine's philosophy. There are four lectures altogether: I. Prolegomena: Mind and its Place in Nature; II. Endolegomena: From Ostension to Quantification; III. Endolegomena loipa: The forked animal; and IV. Epilegomena: What's It all About? The Kant Lectures have been published to date only in Italian and German translation. The present book is filled (...) out with the translator's critical Introduction, "The esoteric Quine?" a bibliography based on Quine's sources, and an Index for the volume. (shrink)

Readers of Phaedrus will have noticed that the rhythm of III. Ep. 34, Palam muttire plebeio piaculum est is unique. Nowhere else does he admit a molossus-word before the final metron of the iambic senarius, and he only admits it here because he is quoting a line from the Telephus of Ennius. Since a scholar whose opinion deserves respect proposes to introduce this rhythm into a reconstruction of a fragment of Laberius it seems worth while to examine its history in (...) order to see how and why it was used, before it was finally banned. For Seneca, like Phaedrus, banns it entirely. The question has already been considered by Klotz, Grundzüge Altrömischer Metrik, pp. 324 sqq.; W. M. Lindsay, Captiui , p. 66; Havet, Métrique, 276 ; and by T. Hingst in his inaugural dissertation De Spondeis et Anapaestis in antepaenultimo pede uersuum generis duplicis Latinorum, Leipzig, 1904. (shrink)

Es ist allgemein bekannt, daß Frege stark von Leibniz beeinflußt worden ist; jedoch behauptet Patzig (Frege, Leibniz u. d. sogenannte ,lingua characteristica universalis', in: Studia Leibnitiana, Suppl., vol. III no. 3 (1969), pp. 103-112), daß seine Leibniz-Kenntnisse nur auf indirekten Quellen fußten und im Grunde äußerst gering waren. Dieser Aufsatz soll zeigen, daß solche und ähnliche Behauptungen auf ungenügender Kenntnis von Freges Schriften beruhen.

Philosophers of language inspired by Grice have long sought to show how facts about reference boil down to facts about speakers’ communicative intentions. I focus on a recent attempt by Stephen Neale (2016), who argues that referring with an expression requires having a special kind of communicative intention—one that involves representing an occurrence of the expression as standing in some particular relation to its referent. Neale raises a problem for this account: because some referring expressions are unpronounced, most language users (...) don’t realize they exist, and so seemingly don’t have intentions about them. Neale suggests that we might solve this problem by supposing that speakers have nonconscious or “tacit” intentions. I argue that this solution can’t work by arguing that our representations of unpronounced bits of language all occur within a modular component of the mind, and so we can’t have intentions about them. From this line of thought, I draw several conclusions. (i) The semantic value of a referring expression is not its referent, but rather a piece of partial and defeasible evidence about what a speaker refers to when using it literally. (ii) There is no interesting sense in which speakers refer with expressions; referring expressions are used to give evidence about the sort of singular proposition one intends to communicate. (iii) The semantics–pragmatics interface is coincident with the interface between the language module and central cognition. (shrink)

In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird ein Begriffsrahmen entwickelt, in dem sich Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen drei Arten von Kulturprodukten klar aufzeigen lassen: Dichtung, Mythos und Wissenschaft. Die allen drei Phänomenen gemeinsame Struktur erfassen wir in §II und §III mit dem Begriff eines Repräsentationssystems, welcher in Anlehnung an die formale Modelltheorie semiotische Vorstellungen mit einem Denken in Systemen zusammenbringt. Die relevanten Unterschiede werden durch Differenzierung (§IV) jenes Begriffs festgemacht, d.h. die drei Phänomene werden durch jeweils spezielle Arten von Repräsentationssystemen erfaßt (§V). (...) Unser spezielles Augenmerk gilt dabei dem Mythos (§I), der sich in letzter Zeit eines wachsenden Interesses -- oft außerhalb des etablierten Wissenschaftsbetriebs -- erfreut. Es zeigt sich, daß der Mythos eine Mittelstellung zwischen Dichtung und Wissenschaft einnimmt: als "Bindeglied" vermittelt er sowohl zwischen der rein begrifflichen Struktur der Phänomene "Dichtung" und "Wissenschaft" als auch zwischen deren Unterschieden in Methode und Wahrheitsanspruch (die in engem Zusammenhang mit der begrifflichen Struktur stehen). Der hier entwickelte begriffliche Rahmen soll in weiteren Untersuchungen als Grundlage zur Herausarbeitung von Unterschieden in der Methode und im Wahrheitsanspruch dienen, die sich aus unserem Ansatz in natürlicher Weise ergeben. Diese müssen jedoch aus Platzgründen einer weiteren Arbeit vorbehalten bleiben. (shrink)

This thesis examines necessary truth and defends a normative, or linguistic, account of it. Roughly, it holds that necessary truths state or follow from conceptual norms (i.e., norms that determine patterns of correct concept use). While the thesis touches upon logical and mathematical truth, its primary focus are those necessary truths typically expressed using natural language. The thesis has three parts. In Part I, I criticise metaphysical accounts of necessity and present and defend a normative account of it. At no (...) point do I give a history of normative accounts, but clearly their roots are to be found in the first half of the twentieth century – in the works of Wittgenstein and Carnap, for example. In Part II, I consider whether language can sustain the normative account. Some argue that the account requires language to be regimented in a way that it is not. I show that while it requires a distinction in kind between empirical and conceptual principles, it nevertheless makes room for indeterminacy regarding whether a given statement is an empirical claim or follows from conceptual norms. Finally, in Part III, I consider the relationship between the world and our conceptual scheme. I argue that denying our concepts answer to the world does not mean that they cannot be justified. The normative account does not say that we have no reasons for categorising things in a certain way, but rather that natural facts, in combination with our interests, are fit to provide them. The purpose of the thesis is to show that normative accounts of necessity can be much more robust than they are often given credit for and needn’t have the malign implications often associated with them. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 97 Unity and Reform: Selected Writings of Nicholas de Cusa. Edited by John P. Dolan. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962. Pp. viii -I- 260. $6.50.) This volume was designed to serve both the cause of historical instruction and the cause of "unity and reform" as it has been stimulated by the present ecumenical movement and Council. Professor Dolan's Introduction emphasizes the practical aspects (...) of the Bishop's career, especially his efforts to combat the disintegration of the Respublica Christiana of the fifteenth century. He explains the Bishop's achievements, both ecclesiastical and philosophical, in terms of the problems of his own time. However, the reader soon discovers in the narrative of the Introduction as well as in the selections from Cusanus's works that the current revival of interest in this theologian and philosopher is due to the important bearing which he has on the Catholic efforts toward reunion and reform today. Only Book III of Learned Ignorance is included; then follow in their entirety Concerning Wisdom, The Vision of God or the Icon, Concerning Concord in Religious Belief (De Pace Fidei); and to illustrate Nicholas of Cusa's interest in mathematics and physics, the volume concludes with a dialogue on experiments in weighing. Hrne~a~T W. Sca~NEm~tt Claremont, California La cosmologie de Giordano Bruno. By Paul-Henri Michel. (Paris: Editions Hermann, 1962. Pp. 341.) Malgr~ les excellents travaux d~j~ publi~s (ceux d'Emile Namer, d'Augusto Guzzo et d'autres ~minents sp~cialistes bruniens), Giordano Bruno demeure une figure historique la lois tr~s c~l~bre et bien myst~rieuse au demeurant. L'exceUent ouvrage de Paul-Henri Michel rendra ainsi les plus grands services aux historiens de la pens~e qui se penchent avec curiosit~ sur la d~concertante p~iode de transition qui s~pare les philosophes de la Renaissance de l'av~nement en Europe d'attitudes proprement modernes devant la r~alit~ ext~rieure et l'homme. S'appuyant sans cesse sur les textes originaux de Bruno lui-mdme, pourvu d'un index complet, le bel ouvrage du Pr. Michel ne d~cevru passes lecteurs ~xudits. Comme il se dolt, rauteur commence par faire le point sur l'homme Bruno, s'attachant faire la distinction qui s'impose entre l'histoire et la l~gende--car la k~gende s'est empar ~e de ce philosophe, consid~r~ volontiers comme un athfie materialiste total ayant voulu d~truire la religion catholique, attitude louse ou vilipendfie selon clue Bruno sera vu comme un h~r~tique pervers ou, au contraire, comme un glorieux martyr de la "librepens ~" rationaliste. On appr~.iera tout sp~cialement les pages (p. 10 et suivantes) darts lesquelles M. Michel s'efforce de faire toute la lumi~re ~, propos du proc~s ecd~iastique de Giordano Bruno--sur lequel toute la lumi~re souhaitable n'avait pas encore ~t~ faite. Mais la majeure paxtie du volume est consacr~e ~ un expos~ m~thodique du syst~me du monde, telle clue l'~tude minutieuse de tousles textes accessibles permet de le structurer. En dix chapitres, l'auteur passe minutieusement--mais toujours d'une mani~re remarquablement logique et claire--les grandes articulations autour desquelles tourne toute la cosmologie brunienne: Le monde comme objet de connaissance, Cosmogonic, Ens mobile, LAme du Monde, La mati~re et l'univers infini, Le systkme solaire, Les mondes innombrables, L'univers vivant, Temps et dternit~. Le grand nombre des citations ~tendues faisant de cette belie ~tude une sorte de fort commode anthologie m~thodique de la pens~e brunienne. 98 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY I1 est incontestable que nous autres contemporains sommes toujours endins 5. voir en Giordano Bruno un penseur franchement "moderne," et le fait est qu'il brave volontiers, prenant intrdpidement parti pour le syst~me de Copernic, la philosophie scolastique et la th~ologie scripturaire; son grandiose hymne mdtaphysique 5. l'infini de l'univers et 5. la r6partition innombrable des syst~mes plan~taires rend be1 et bien un son r~volutionnaire pour son temps. Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas pour rien que Bruno rut mis 5. l'index pour... (shrink)

In the vast literature on architectural theory and practice, the ways in which architectural knowledge is actually taught, debated, and understood are too often ignored. The essays collected in this groundbreaking volume address the current state of architecture as an academic and professional discipline. The issues considered range from the form and content of architectural education to the architect's social and environmental obligations and the emergence of a new generation of architects. Often critical of the current paradigm, these essays offer (...) a provocative challenge to accepted assumptions about the production, dissemination, and reception of architectural knowledge. Contributors: Sherry Ahrentzen, U of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; Stanford Anderson, MIT; Carol Burns, Harvard U; Russell Ellis, UC Berkeley; Thomas Fisher, U of Minnesota; Linda Groat, U of Michigan; Kay Bea Jones, Ohio State U; David Leatherbarrow, U of Pennsylvania; A. G. Krishna Menon, TVB School of Habitat Studies, India; Garth Rockcastle, U of Minnesota; Michael Stanton, American U, Beirut; Sharon E. Sutton, U of Washington; David J. T. Vanderburgh, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium; and Donald Watson, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY: A METHODOLOGICAL PROPOSAL KEVIN w. IRWIN The Catholic University of America Washington, D.O. HE PAST DEOADE has witnessed the publication of number of English language works on sacraments ealing with general theories of sacramental theology as well as specialized studies of individual sacraments. In the postoonciliar church there is not yet a uniform or universally agreed upon method for the study of sacraments. Still most vecerrt 'Wo11ks (...) indicate significant shifts in method from the post-Tr:identine!legacy o:f treating sacraments priimarily in dogmatic tracts and canon law studies.1 At the s1ame time there has been an increased interest by liturgists and theologians alike in liturgical theology. This includes not only the theologicrul dimensions of what occurs in the liturgy hut 1also (more recently) how the liturgy can serve as a source for theology in geneml as well 1as for the theology of the sacraments.2 Despite this recent writing and evolving thought on the rela1 See, Kevin W. Irwin, "Recent Sacramental Theology: A Review Discus· sion," The Thomist 47 (1983) : 592-608; "Recent Sacramental Theology [Review Discussion II]" The Thomist 52 (1988) : 124-147; "Recent Sacramental Theology III," The Thomist 53 (1989) : 281-313. 2 Among the English language works that have sparked interest in liturgical theology and have shaped part of the contemporary deb-ate about what it includes are those of Aidan Kavanagh, On Liturgical Theology (New York: Pueblo, 1984) and Geoffrey Wainwright, Doxology: The Praise of God in Worship, Doctrine and Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). For an assessment of these works and other recent writing on liturgical theology see Teresa Berger, "'Doxology,' 'Jubilate,' 'Liturgical Theology ': Zurn Verhaltnis von Liturgie und Theologie: Publikationen aus dem englischsprachen Raum,'' Arohiv fur Liturgiewissensohaft 28 (1986) : 247-255. 311 KEVIN W. IRWIN tionship of liturgy and sacramental theology, what is still lacking is some method for developing a contemporary theology of the sacraments with the liturgy as its foundation. There are many reasons for this lack: shifts in contemporary theological method in general, the nature of the reformed liturgy which invites flexibility and option, and :finally questions of wha;t ought to be factol'ed into a systemat1c study of the sacramental theology and of sacramental life in the postconciliar church. It is the purpose of this article to propose 1a, method for sacramental theology which uses liturgy as its essentia1l foundation and which delineates aspects of sacriamental theology 1that can be based on the liturgy. The article will be divided into ctwo unequal parts, with the :first laying the foundation for the second. The first deals with the general notion of a liturgical theology of the sacraments, with particular 1attention to the postconciliar context for this discussion.3 This foundation leads to the seoond pa:rt which proposes aspects of sacramental theology that are first drnwn from the liturgy and then can he used to understand 1both individual sacraments and sacraments in general hy continual reference to the liturgy. In delineating these aspects of a liturgically grounded sacramental theology, the categories of classical sacramental theology will be respected, in the sense that, despite their deficiencies, systematic treatises on 'Sacraments from the medieval and post-Tr,identine s This is not to suggest that the seminal works of such authors as Cipriano Vagaggini, Theological Dimensions of the Liturgy, trans. Leonard J. Doyle and W. A. Jurgens from the fourth Italian edition (Collegeville: The Litur· gical Press, 1976) and Alexander Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology, trans. Ashleigh Moorhouse (London: The F'aith Press, 1966), will be ignored. It is to suggest, however, that the recent work on liturgical theology has had to consider the flexibility of postconciliar liturgy as opposed to the fixity of the preconciliar rites. On this as an important factor in the method of doing liturgical theology see P. DeC!erck, "Lex orandi, lex oredendi, sens original et avatars historiq'ues d'un adage equivoque," Questions Liturgiques 59 (1978) : 193-212, and Gerarcl Lukken, "La liturgic comme lieu theologique irremplacable," Questions Liturgiques 56 (1975) : 104-109. SACRAM:ENTAL THEOLOGY 313 periods have left a v:aluable legacy of sacramental theory and prractice.4 The following six aspects of the liturgical experience... (shrink)

Vagueness is an ultimate challenge. An enormous diversity of literature on the topic has accumulated over the years, with no hint of a consensus emerging. In this light, Section 1 presents the main aspects of the challenge vagueness poses, focusing on the category of adjectives, and then gives some brief illustrations of the pervasive manifestations of vagueness in grammar.Section 2 deals with theSorites paradox, which for many philosophers is the hallmark of vagueness: By assigning avague predicate step by apparently inescapable (...) step to more and more objects one is eventually led to assign it to entities of which it plainly isn’t true.It is hard to resist the force of the paradox once one has been exposed to it. The result of this has been that many see the philosophical problem presented by vagueness as nothing other than the problem of solving the Sorites.The efforts to solve the Sorites paradox have uncovered a range of important connections between vagueness and other aspects of language and thought. But most of these seem to lead further and further away from what some consider the core issues that vagueness raises.Given the challenge posed by the Sorites, it is rather remarkable to discover that there is a lot more to vagueness beyond the paradox. In fact, linguists traditionally leave it to the philosophers to deal with the Sorites and put their own efforts into dealing with other manifestations of vagueness in natural language and their consequences for grammar. Page 2 2Section 3 reviews some of these additional phenomena, centering around three issues: (i) the controversial connections between vagueness and morphological gradability, (ii) the similarity and differences between the phenomena of vagueness and imprecision, and (iii) the ways in which vagueness infiltrates various grammatical constructions we find in language, with consequences for the architecture of grammar.The aim of this section is to highlight the main questions which any theory of vagueness will ultimately have to address. (shrink)

The world appears to conscious creatures in terms of experienced sensory qualities, but science doesn't find sensory experience in that world, only physical objects and properties. I argue that the failure to locate consciousness in the world is a function of our necessarily representational relation to reality as knowers: we won't discover the terms in which reality is represented by us in the world as it appears in those terms. Qualia -- arguably a type of representational content -- will therefore (...) not be found in the physical world as characterized in experience or science. Instead, consciousness constitutes a subjective, representational reality for cognitive systems such as ourselves, and the physical world is a represented objective reality. I suggest that naturalistic approaches to explaining consciousness should acknowledge the non-objectivity of experience, and be constrained by evidence that consciousness accompanies certain sorts of behaviour-controlling representational functions carried out by complex, physically instantiated mind-systems. I evaluate a variety of current hypotheses about consciousness, and suggest that a mature science of representation may help explain why, perhaps as matter of representational necessity, experience arises as a natural but not objectively discoverable phenomenon. (shrink)

The main result of this paper is the following theorem: a closure space X has an , , Q-regular base of the power iff X is Q-embeddable in It is a generalization of the following theorems:(i) Stone representation theorem for distributive lattices ( = 0, = , Q = ), (ii) universality of the Alexandroff's cube for T 0-topological spaces ( = , = , Q = 0), (iii) universality of the closure space of filters in the lattice of all (...) subsets for , -closure spaces (Q = 0). By this theorem we obtain some characterizations of the closure space given by the consequence operator for the classical propositional calculus over a formalized language of the zero order with the set of propositional variables of the power . In particular we prove that a countable closure space X is embeddable with finite disjunctions preserved into F iff X is a consistent closure space satisfying the compactness theorem and X contains a 0, -base consisting of -prime sets. (shrink)

Se presenta el argumento de W. T. Stace sobre el realismo señalando no que éste sea falso sino solamente que no hay absolutamente ninguna razón para considerar que sea verdadero y por tanto no tenemos por qué creerlo. Esto se aplica a la discusión de la pregunta: ¿Cómo sabemos que los átomos existen? Haciendo referencia a algunas de las respuestas científicas más importantes conocidas que son en orden cronológico: i) La ley de las proporciones definidas o Ley de Proust, ii) (...) la teoría cinética de los gases, iii) el movimiento Browniano y, iv) imágenes de microscopio de efecto túnel. (shrink)